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Abstract 
 
The sheer scale and speed of the shift of payment system from time-based salaries to performance-
related pay, PRP, in the British public services provides a unique opportunity to test the effects of 
incentive pay schemes.  This study is based on the first large scale survey designed to measure the 
effects of performance related pay on a) employee motivation and work behaviour across the British 
public services; and b) workplace performance.  The latter uses an index of organisational 
performance based on line-manager judgements.  While there is evidence of a clear incentive effect 
for those gaining above average PRP, it is likely that it is offset by a more widespread de-motivating 
effect arising from difficulties of measuring and evaluating performance fairly.  These motivational 
outcomes are found to affect workplace performance.  Organisational commitment appears to offset 
some of the negative effects of PRP.  In contrast to the many studies of top executives, sales and 
sports personnel, our study examines PRP for large numbers of ordinary employees. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The ‘New Economics of Personnel’ stresses the superiority of performance-related over time-based 
pay systems under circumstances in which employees can exercise a good deal of discretion in their 
jobs and their effort is hard to monitor (Fernie and Metcalf, 1999).  It places a strong emphasis on 
financial rewards as incentives, and seeks to show how their design should be adapted to tackle 
different types of monitoring problems.  It is a powerful theory with important predictions because 
these conditions apply in a very large number of workplaces.  However, as Prendergast (1999) 
observes in his JEL review article, empirical testing so far has concentrated on chief executives, sales 
and sports personnel, and there is a dearth of studies on the effects of incentive pay on ordinary 
employees.  This article reports a large-scale study on the workings of performance pay for ordinary 
employees.  In doing so, it finds that the effect of marginal financial incentives is small compared with 
that of goal-setting and appraisal.  In the conclusion, we propose an explanation of why PRP is so 
difficult to administer successfully for ordinary employees. 
The large-scale switch from time- to performance-based pay in the British public services 
over the past decade offers an excellent opportunity to test the relevance of some of these theories 
for ordinary employees, and to examine the role of financial incentives compared with other ways of 
steering employee motivation.  This article analyses results from the first large-scale study of 
performance pay in the British public services to explore its effects on motivation and work relations.  
It seeks first to establish how far employees judge the new incentives to have motivated them to 
perform better, what they believe have been their effects on workplace cooperation, and how far 
alternative motivational forces, such as commitment and a belief in work standards are active in 
sustaining performance levels.  Secondly, it compares these motivational measures with line 
managers’ judgements of the effects on workplace performance.  We conclude that the introduction 
of performance pay has been associated with increased levels of effort as judged both by ordinary 
employees and the line managers who appraise their performance.  However, the financial incentive 
has played a rather small part compared with the much more important role, for better and for 
worse, of goal-setting and appraisal.  Improved goal-setting may raise performance in two ways, 
and herein lies a fundamental ambiguity:  in part it can clarify work goals, and in part, it enables 
management to negotiate higher levels of performance which may not always be voluntarily given.  
Our results lead us to conclude that, for ordinary employees, more systematic attention 
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should be given to the way employee goals are set, and the interplay of interests involved, and how 
they are handled. 
For a great many jobs in the public services, the New Economics of Personnel (NEP) 
would predict that performance pay would give superior results.  Teachers, health service 
professionals, job placement advisers and many tax officials have considerable control over how 
they work, and in many cases, it is very hard for management to monitor the degree of effort and 
care they put into their jobs.  In this regard, public sector employees differ little from their private 
sector counterparts.  They also resemble private sector employees in that assessment of their 
performance relies heavily on subjective appraisal by line managers.  From the point of view of 
incentive theory, conditions for public sector employees have become more like those in the private 
sector in another respect.  The break up of large bureaucracies into specialist agencies responsible 
for the delivery of specific services, each with its own set of performance targets has reduced the 
problems posed by conflicting levels of political and management leadership (‘multiple principals’, 
Tirole, 1994).  Finally, as Bewley’s (1999) recent study shows, private employers also feel the need 
to take account of employees’ sentiments of fairness, commitment and risk aversion when adjusting 
their pay-maintaining employee, ‘morale’ being one of their key concerns. 
Performance related pay (PRP) has been at the forefront of the reform of pay incentives for 
public servants in the UK since the late 1980s.  By the late 1990s, it had replaced pure time-based 
pay with annual increases based on seniority for most civil servants, and for many in local 
government (Heery, 1998) and the health service (Bach and Winchester, 1999).  In schools, head 
teachers also had a form of PRP, and from 2000-01, classroom teachers also have their own 
system.  The introduction of a new pay system on this scale offers an excellent test of some of the 
NEP theories of incentives.  Its sheer scale gives an opportunity to assess the effects of performance 
pay across a wide variety of work environments and occupations.  The drive for PRP from central 
government means that it has been implemented both where local management might have adopted it 
anyway, such as in the NHS hospital trusts in our sample, and where agency management might, if 
free, have preferred a different kind of scheme.  An example of the latter is the Employment Service 
whose moves to develop team-working conflicted with individual performance pay.  Our study 
therefore avoids some of the organisational self-selection problems highlighted by Prendergast 
(1999). 
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The shift to performance pay has also brought an end to seniority-based increments.  In fact, 
these were never intended to provide automatic progression up to the top of the pay scale for a 
particular grade, but as the Megaw inquiry (1982) observed, procedures for withholding increments 
for poor performance were rarely if ever invoked.  In effect, public servants were paid on time rates, 
independently of their short-term performance.  This is reinforced by the weakness of promotion as 
an incentive for a great many non-managerial public servants.  The National Audit Office highlighted 
the slow rates of promotion for many in the civil service, for example, 20 years for a newly 
promoted SEO to reach the next grade up of Principal (NAO, 1989).  Another trend shared with 
private firms, the ‘de-layering’ of recent years will have restricted promotion still further.  This is also 
reflected in employee expectations.  In the evidence to the Sheehy enquiry on police pay, for 
example, it was found that over 40% of police officers did not expect to be promoted, despite the 
rank structure and a strong internal labour market (Touche Ross, 1993). 
Performance pay in the British public services is mostly consolidated into basic salary so that 
the accumulation of above average awards can lead to quite big and lasting benefits for individual 
employees.  Most commonly, line managers award performance pay on the basis of individual 
performance appraisal against pre-agreed objectives.  Given the importance assumed by qualitative 
aspects of public service performance, appraisal by line managers has been the preferred route, as 
predicted by the NEP.  Nevertheless, line managers are given guidelines about relevant criteria, and 
about the need to be concrete about performance objectives, not least because the schemes must be 
defensible if challenged as discriminatory.  The organisations covered in this study follow the same 
broad principles as those elsewhere in the British public services,  with one exception.  One of the 
trust hospitals, has a trust-wide performance bonus payable to all satisfactory performers if the trust 
achieves its targets.  Since the first performance pay schemes in the Inland Revenue in the late 1980s 
(see Marsden and Richardson, 1994), appraisal has undergone a sea change.  It has moved away 
from evaluation against a standard set of criteria for all employees, and towards setting individual 
objectives in line with those of the organisation as a whole.  In many respects, all these schemes 
have followed the cannons of personnel management ‘best practice’ at the time as systematised by 
bodies such as the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, ACAS (1990), and leading 
private sector consultants such as Armstrong and Murlis (1994). 
Our study is the first major survey of PRP for individual employees across a variety of public 
service organisations in the UK.  The sample includes about 5,000 employees in two civil service 
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departments (the Inland Revenue and the Employment Service); two National Health Service trust 
hospitals; and primary and secondary school head teachers, surveyed between August 1996 and 
March 1997.  It covers therefore both a variety of occupations and two different types of 
organisation:  ‘bureaucratic’ and ‘professional’ bureaucracies. 
 
 
2.  Principal-Agent Moral Hazard Analysis of Performance Pay 
 
The theoretical rationale for performance related pay has been most clearly stated in the ‘principal-
agent moral hazard’ model.  The idea can be explained very simply in terms of Figure 1.  For 
simplicity, assume that employees have discretion over the level of effort they provide, and that they 
can choose between providing ‘low effort’ (e1) and ‘high effort’ (e2).  Suppose too that they wish to 
minimise the effort they exert for a given reward, and that the employer cannot observe effort 
directly. 
If the employer offers a fixed wage, then employees will supply ‘low effort’.  The employer 
could respond by reducing the wage until it matches the value of the low effort level, but this may not 
always be desirable for either party.  One solution is to link pay to observed output or performance, 
with a low wage (w1) for low-effort-output (e1), and a high wage (w2) for high-effort-output (e2).  
This allows employees to choose, and the employer can offer a schedule of wages designed to 
encourage e2. 
If performance is easily measured and strongly correlated with employee effort this is a fairly 
simple matter.  But in practice often neither relationship is straightforward.  This is shown by the 
dispersion of performance levels associated respectively with the ‘low’ and ‘high effort’ levels.  The 
two black (narrow) distribution curves represent the dispersion of output levels associated with each 
level of effort.  As is well known, one might work hard and achieve low output because of lack of 
suitable training, poor management coordination, or other factors outside one’s control.  Equally, 
one may be lazy but lucky.  With the two black distribution curves, the overlap is small so it is fairly 
easy for management to discriminate between employees providing the low or the high levels of 
effort.  However, the curves could overlap a great deal more, as do the grey ones, and then it is 
much harder to determine whether a given level of output, say ‘X’, corresponds to low or high 
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effort.  In this case, there is a much greater chance that employees who work hard will not be 
rewarded, and vice versa. 
The solution, which has received more attention in the NEP literature, has been to use more 
highly geared incentives, by offering a performance bonus that is a larger percentage of basic salary 
(eg.  Lazear, 1999, Ch.  3).  In effect, the ‘prize’ is made larger to compensate for the greater 
probability of error.  An alternative solution, more common in the HRM literature, is to stress the 
need for improved appraisal systems (e.g. by developing procedural justice, see Cropanzano and 
Fulger, 1991).  Good appraisal can help by agreeing objectives and obtaining better measurement of 
outcomes, particularly where it is hard to obtain valid objective measures.  In the public services, 
there are severe constraints on the use of highly geared incentives for large numbers of staff for 
budgetary and other reasons, which places a greater burden on the fairness of appraisals. 
 
Figure 1.  Distribution of Performance or Output for Two Given Levels of ‘Effort’ 
 
 
 
Output  
Probability  
Observed output  
e1  e2  X  
Low effort  High effort  
 
 
Difficulty of measuring performance raises a second problem:  whether management, which controls 
performance evaluation, can be trusted to act fairly.  Given the need for a mix of quantitative and 
qualitative work objectives, there is little alternative to subjective appraisal if a bias towards 
quantitative outcomes is to be avoided (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).  However, it is very 
difficult for employees to verify the accuracy and fairness of such appraisals at the individual level.  
Whatever the actual honesty with which appraisals are conducted, our survey illustrates the depth of 
employee suspicion regarding ‘moral hazard’ by their employers.  Across the organisations we 
surveyed, it was widely thought that performance pay was a device to cut the pay bill.  Over 60% 
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thought management applied a quota to good appraisals; around 55% of employees thought they 
would not be awarded performance pay even if their work was good enough; and over 40% 
thought line managers used performance pay to reward their favourites1.  On the latter two 
questions, similar results have been found in the US federal service (Milkovitch and Wigdor, 1991). 
Finally, Figure 1 brings out the importance of the initial assumption that employees are ‘effort 
minimisers’ and will opt for ‘low effort’ if they think it will pass undetected.  That raises the question 
as to what sustained effort among the majority of public servants before PRP was introduced.  
Promotion may have been part of the answer, but, as mentioned earlier, for most employees such 
opportunities are limited.  In some kinds of clerical work, clear job descriptions and well-paced 
work flows make sub-standard performance easily detectable by line managers.  In contrast, where 
employees have a lot of discretion, as is the case for many public servants, a mixture of 
organisational commitment, and a belief in professional work values, may well counteract such 
tendencies.  Much of the writing on commitment (eg.  Meyer and Allen’s review of 1997) stresses 
that shared goals between an organisation’s management and its employees may encourage the latter 
to use their discretion positively as part of a diffuse social exchange with the organisation.  Such 
employees would be less likely to take advantage of difficulties in monitoring their effort to provide 
as little as they can get away with.  There is however an alternative scenario:  that committed 
employees may oppose the increased management control that accompanies PRP because they see 
it as implying a lesser degree of trust in their willingness to work for their organisation. 
 
 
3.  Measuring the Effects of PRP on Work Behaviour and Attitudes In 
Public Services 
 
3.1  Measures of motivation and performance 
 
We consider four main kinds of impact of performance pay:  on motivation, on work relations, on 
communicating management objectives, and on workplace performance.  The first three correspond 
to different aspects of the motivational outcomes sought by the use of incentive pay:  giving 
                                                 
1. The favouritism question was not asked of head teachers. 
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employees greater incentive to provide higher levels of effort; encouraging more flexible working and 
team work; and redirecting employees’ effort towards new goals that management wants them to 
achieve.  The fourth looks at organisational performance outcomes as observed by line managers. 
 
a) Motivation 
We interpret motivation as the willingness to undertake certain kinds of action, but we also ask 
about public servants’ agreement with the principle of performance pay, and whether they believe it 
rewards good work.  Particularly important in the principal-agent analysis, but also in the views of 
management expressed to us in our interviews, was the willingness of staff to use their work 
discretion to the benefit of the organisation.  We focused on whether staff felt PRP gave them an 
incentive to work beyond the requirements of their jobs, and to show more initiative in their work.  
Agreement with the principle implies accepting its legitimacy as an ex ante incentive, in-keeping with 
the principal-agent analysis.  Agreeing that it rewards good work captures a different nuance:  that 
one appreciates the ex post recognition by one’s boss, and this might appeal more to those 
attracted to the intrinsic satisfactions of their work which might be especially important in health and 
education services (Deci and Ryan, 1985). 
 
b) Work relations 
In much of the public service, a high degree of cooperation between employees is needed for 
efficient working.  Indeed, management has sought to encourage greater team working.  We 
therefore asked employees whether, in their experience, performance pay caused jealousies among 
staff; whether it undermined team working; whether it improved cooperation with management; and 
whether management operated a quota on good assessments.  The first two would be outcomes of 
PRP that inhibit more flexible work organisation.  Likewise, willingness to cooperate with 
management becomes more important the greater the amount of discretion employees have in their 
work.  Finally, whether management operate a ‘quota’ on performance pay and performance ratings 
can be interpreted as an indicator of trust in higher management.  In fact, in the Inland Revenue, 
higher management instructed line managers not to apply a quota, and the Employment Service 
scheme, like that of the trust-wide bonus hospital, had no place for a quota of any kind.  Only the 
hospital using individual-PRP applied a standardised distribution.  We also asked whether people 
thought their managers would give them a good appraisal if they performed well. 
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c) Communicating objectives 
Over the past decade, there has been considerable devolution of public management:  towards 
specialist agencies, hospital trusts and local management of schools.  One reason has been to enable 
management to formulate objectives closer to the point at which public services are delivered than 
previously.  In all the organisations we studied, there was strong emphasis on formulating clear 
organisational objectives and communicating these to individual employees, together with a view that 
performance appraisal was a natural focus for this.  The more discretion employees have, the more 
important it is that they are aware of organisational objectives.  We therefore asked whether 
employees believed that PRP had raised their awareness of their organisation’s objectives. 
 
d) Line manager judgements of performance in their workplace 
Line managers, who set individual employees’ work objectives and appraise their performance, 
occupy a unique position to observe the effects of PRP on performance.  We were able to link these 
with the results for individual employees by taking advantage of the division of the two civil service 
departments into a dozen or so executive offices each.  The same was done for each hospital.  This 
supplemented the limited aggregate evidence we had from senior management and line managers 
that effort levels had increased, by enabling us to use the variation in performance outcomes 
between offices, as reported by line managers, to explore the effects of positive incentive and 
negative de-motivating aspects of PRP. 
 
3.2 Independent variables 
 
Among our independent variables we consider four main types: 
· Financial incentive 
· Goal-setting 
· Quality of appraisal 
· Measurability of performance 
· Motivation patterns and commitment 
 
We also include a number of control variables relating to the organisation, the employee’s 
ISCO one-digit occupation, length of service and gender.  Among these, the Inland Revenue in 
9  
1996 and Managers are taken as the two benchmarks for the organisational and occupational 
dummies. 
For the financial incentive, we asked how much performance pay individuals had received or 
what had been their latest appraisal score when this determined their pay award.  Under the civil 
service and hospital schemes, PRP had replaced seniority increments, and so practically everyone 
now gets performance pay.  We experimented with two measures:  the level of performance award 
received, and whether employees got above average awards.  Only the latter had any effect so that 
was the one we included.  We also experimented with a question on people’s subjective rating of 
their own performance, on the ground that those who believe their performance is better than their 
colleagues’ would be more likely to find performance pay motivating.2 
Given the need to distinguish incentive from appraisal effects, it was critical to establish that 
our measures of quality of appraisal were not contaminated by general feelings about performance 
pay.  In one of the trust hospitals, we included several additional questions that related to very 
specific and concrete aspects of the appraisal process to which we applied a factor analysis.3 We 
regressed the more general indicators that we had for all the organisations in our study on these, and 
found that the detailed questions predicted them well.  We selected three general indicators of 
appraisal effectiveness in this way.  They were whether employees felt PRP had led their managers 
to set work targets more clearly; whether they thought their last appraisal was a fair reflection of 
their performance; and whether they thought their line managers knew enough about their jobs to 
appraise them accurately and fairly.4 
Many public service jobs offer great opportunities for intrinsic motivation.  Collecting the 
revenue needed for public services, helping job seekers, looking after the sick and educating 
children can all be rewarding activities in their own right.  Such non-pecuniary benefits may attract 
                                                 
2. It was only very weakly correlated with receiving performance pay, and so it is unlikely that it was greatly 
influenced by it. 
 
3 These were the following:  a) consultation:  opportunity to discuss with one’s line manager during the past year 
on:  performance, job role, to identify objectives, and training needs; b) supportiveness:  whether the interview 
was judged to be irrelevant, superficial, threatening, or useful; c) clarity:  whether employees know what they 
have to do to get a good appraisal, their job role is clear, their training needs are clear, and they understand the 
reasons for their latest assessment.  
 
4 . Measurement problems can arise because employees doubt that management will or is competent to apply 
valid criteria, and because they doubt it can measure them reliably and honestly. This is particularly likely in 
health and education, where many employees believe that they work to professional standards, and which they 
do not regard management as competent to measure (Zucker, 1991). 
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many into the public service.  Deci and Ryan (1985) argue that strong intrinsic motivation is 
associated with a strong desire for autonomy in one’s work.  Such employees would resent being 
treated as if their good performance were motivated by marginal increments in pay, and the resulting 
closer performance monitoring by management.  We used factor analysis to combine the questions 
on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.5 
Organisational commitment is widely held to imply a strong belief in and acceptance of the 
organisation’s goals; a willingness to exert extra effort on its behalf; and a strong desire to maintain 
membership (Mowday, Steers and Porter, 1981).  Our measures of commitment were based on 
scales developed by Meyer and Allen (1997) and Peccei and Guest (1993) and are described in the 
appendix.6 
 All of these variables are summarised in Table 1. 
 
 
4.  Results:  Motivational Outcomes 
 
The overall results show that the majority of public employees in our sample accepted the principle 
of linking pay to performance (Table 2).  However, they were more sceptical as to whether it was 
an effective incentive, either ex post in rewarding good performance, or ex ante in providing an 
incentive to work beyond job requirements or to show more initiative.  On the whole too only one 
third thought it had made them more aware of their organisation’s objectives, although this could 
have been because they were already aware of them.  Against this evidence of weak overall 
incentive effects, stand the findings that the schemes were demotivating and divisive, a finding 
highlighted by the government’s Makinson Report (2000) on the reform of civil service PRP.  Two 
thirds of staff thought PRP caused jealousies, many thought it discouraged team working, that 
                                                 
5 . These concerned notably what people felt attractive about their current jobs: varied and interesting work, 
opportunities for responsibility, and pay and career opportunities.  We used factor analysis to construct the 
variables. 
 
6 . Our measures of commitment were based on whether employees felf working for their organisation meant a 
great deal to them, whether they would be as happy working in another organisation, whether they felt ‘part of 
the family’ in their current office, whether they felt they were contributing to an important public service, whether 
they felt ‘emotionally attached’ to their current organisation (negative), whether it was fair to use PRP in order to 
prevent staff from leaving, and whether employees usually lose out whenever things change in their 
organisation. Factor analysis was used to derive the variable. 
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management operated a quota to restrict good appraisals, and a significant minority felt it had 
reduced their cooperativeness with management. 
To simplify presentation, we combined these variables, using factor analysis, into two 
summary factors:  positive incentive effects of PRP, and negative demotivating effects.  These were 
converted into a suitable form for a logit analysis (Table 3).  The individual logit regressions on each 
variable are given in Appendix Table 1. 
Taking the positive incentive effects, there were strong and significant coefficients on both 
receiving above average performance pay, and on people’s own estimation of their performance 
relative to other staff, and hence their estimate of their likely success in getting it.  Also coming out 
strongly were the variables relating to the quality of appraisal and goal-setting.  If employees thought 
PRP had led managers to set targets more clearly (because they have to appraise them afterwards), 
and if they thought their last appraisal fair, then they were more likely to experience positive incentive 
effects.  In the same vein, if they thought their performance hard to measure satisfactorily, or they 
had a prior notion that there was an appropriate standard for their work, they were less likely to feel 
the incentive.  Whether motivation was extrinsic or intrinsic seemed overall to make little difference.  
However, committed employees, whether affective or goal commitment, were more likely to 
respond that PRP was motivating. 
It is of considerable interest to know how the strength of the financial incentive compares 
with that of effective appraisal and goal-setting.  Logit coefficients are not easy to interpret for this 
purpose.  As is well-known, logit regression coefficients tell us the change in the log of the odds7 that 
a person will find PRP motivating for a unit change in the independent variable.  This cumbersome 
concept can be made simpler by taking the exponent:  the proportionate change in the odds arising 
from a unit change in the independent variable (Table 4).  Values of less than one imply a decrease 
in the odds.  Thus in moving to above average PRP increases the odds by a factor of 1.7.  Because 
the mean values of the independent variables differ, it may be felt preferable to compare elasticities.  
These relativise the effect of getting above average performance pay:  although still strong, at 0.3, it 
is considerably less so than the other variables.  However, comparing elasticities for binary and five-
point scale variables is far from ideal, so a final check on the relative strength of each variable was 
done by computing logit coefficients for all of them measured as binary variables.  This involves 
                                                 
7. The ‘odds’ are used in their strict sense here to refer to the ratio of the probality of the event occurring to its 
not occurring. 
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some loss of information, but it shows that the effect of getting above average performance pay, at 
0.54, is probably weaker than the beneficial effects of setting work targets more clearly (1.2), and is 
of a comparable order of magnitude to the negative effects of unfair appraisals and perceived 
measurement difficulties.  A similar picture emerges when we consider the negative demotivating 
effects.  Incentive effects are relatively small compared with those of the quality of appraisal and 
goal-setting. 
These calculations show that the financial incentive effect is quite small compared with the 
importance of a well-organised and felt-fair appraisal and goal-setting system. 
 
 
5.  Results:  Workplace Performance Outcomes 
 
So far the analysis has dealt exclusively with the effects of performance pay on individual employees’ 
motivation and work attitudes.  As is well-known, employee reports of increased motivation may 
not correlate with improved organisational performance for many reasons.  Jobs may give little 
scope for discretion owing to tight supervision or closely specified duties.  Other factors such as 
customer pressure, direct pressure from management, or employees’ own internalised feelings of 
commitment to professional standards or to organisational goals may cause motivation and 
performance to diverge. 
We know from conversations with senior managers either during our fieldwork interviews or 
the feedback sessions at which we presented our findings that management generally did not believe 
organisational performance had declined.  Given the increased use of organisational performance 
indicators across the public sector which top management were expected to achieve, such 
impressions are likely to be well-grounded although they are too broad-brush for our immediate 
purposes.8 More valuable for our study than overall judgements and overall organisational 
indicators, we had line-manager judgements of how aspects of staff performance had changed.  
Because these line-managers are central both to the setting of employee objectives and to appraisal 
                                                 
8 . Although senior managers did not have survey data comparable to our own, we know they have used quite 
sophisticated internal benchmarking of performance for some time (eg. National Audit Office, 1989), and in some 
cases carry out their own internal staff surveys. 
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of their achievements, they are in a privileged position to observe the first key link in the chain 
between individual motivation and organisational performance. 
For the two civil service departments and our two trust hospitals we were able to link 
individual employee replies to those of their line-managers at the level of the individual workplace.  
We were able to match employee and line-manager reports for a total of 25 workplaces in 1996-
97, which rose to 38 if we included also the Inland Revenue data for 1991.  Because of differences 
in the questions posed, most of our analysis is limited to workplaces in the 1996-97 surveys. 
We use two questions in particular of those posed to line-managers about the effects of PRP 
on the performance of other staff:  whether it had caused many of the staff to work harder; and 
whether it had caused them to cooperate less with management.  The overall replies to these 
questions in each organisation are shown in Table 5.  Because of the way we asked the question 
about work intensity, ‘declines’, ‘no change’ and ‘no view’ are lumped all together.  On both 
questions, a very substantial minority of line managers believed PRP had caused many staff to work 
harder, and a comparable minority thought it had reduced staff cooperation with management.  
Somewhat smaller percentages of individual staff took the same view about their own personal effort 
and cooperativeness. 
The most obvious concern about our use of such data to gauge workplace performance is 
whether line-manager reports are measuring aspects of this or something quite different, such as their 
own deeply held views on the principle, or the perceived fairness of their own latest performance 
rating.  Crude correlations between these are weak and mostly not significant.  A more pertinent test 
is whether line-manager reports about effort levels and cooperation in the workplace coincide with 
those of ordinary, non-managerial, staff in the same workplace (Table 6).  Because the number of 
workplaces in 1996-97 is rather small, we repeated the same analysis including data for the Inland 
Revenue in 1991 to see whether significance levels rose and the signs remained the same with 
additional observations.  This is what happened.  So we conclude that line-manager reports on 
workplace performance did indeed correspond to the experience of non-managerial employees. 
The next question was whether we could establish a relationship between the earlier 
motivational outcomes of PRP and line-manager assessments of workplace performance.  To do 
this, we computed the mean line-manager estimate of workplace performance (for increased work 
intensity and cooperativeness), and assigned these to each individual employee in the sample.  We 
then regressed our measures of workplace performance on the non-manager motivation scores 
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(Table 7).  To boost the number of observations we included the Inland Revenue data for 1991 
together with a year dummy for 1996-97.  As can be seen, there was a modest but strongly 
significant relationship between the motivational outcomes and workplace performance.  As 
expected, positive incentive effects were associated with increased work effort and cooperation, 
and negative demotivating effects, with the opposite. 
One notable feature is the size of the coefficient on the year dummy, indicating a big change 
in work intensity and in the willingness to cooperate between 1991 and 1996 (visible also in Table 
5).  In the Inland Revenue, there was an important change in the PRP system with the introduction of 
‘extra loading’, affecting about one fifth of respondents.  Posts thus classified brought more highly 
geared incentives.  For example, a ‘Succeed’ in an ‘Extra loaded’ post brought the same reward as 
an ‘Exceed’ in one that was normally loaded.  Thus, compared with the scheme in force in 1991, 
that of 1996 was specially designed to solicit greater efforts from staff, and it corresponded to an 
increased workload on the organisation.9 
Finally, we offer a more detailed examination of how different aspects of PRP affect 
performance by regressing the measures of workplace performance on the variables found to affect 
individual motivation directly (Table 8).  The full set of variables was available only for 1996-97, 
which reduces the number of workplace means to 25, so we use simple regressions rather than 
logits in order to conserve the limited information we have on workplace performance.  Unlike in the 
earlier logit regressions (Table 3), schools are excluded because we had head teacher judgements 
only. 
Leaving aside the control variables, the positive incentive effects of above average 
performance pay and managers setting targets more clearly boost workplace effort, and the 
experience of unfair appraisals diminishes it.  Likewise, intrinsic motivation (interesting work) and 
goal commitment (public service) help PRP to boost effort levels.  Turning to cooperation, belief that 
there is a standard for the job, and commitment to one’s workplace, seem to protect PRP against 
damage to cooperation.  One puzzle is that managers setting targets more clearly should reduce 
cooperation.  This may reflect the ambiguity of goal-setting mentioned earlier between clarifying 
goals and negotiating targets.  Our survey provided evidence of both (Marsden and French, 1998). 
                                                 
9. One of the biggest of these was the introduction of ‘Self Assessment’ for self-employed people. 
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Full comparison with the earlier results for individual motivation is limited by the small 
number of workplaces, making the coefficients less well determined, and by the exclusion of 
schools.  This was particularly so for the cooperation regression where a number of the coefficients 
in the logit equations lost significance when head teachers were excluded.  The most important of 
these were the effect of getting PRP and target setting, both of which helped combat demotivation at 
the individual level, but fell below the significance threshold when head teachers were taken out of 
the sample. 
 
 
6.  A Test of Attribution 
 
The size of the dummy variable for the Inland Revenue results for 1991 (Table 7) raises a difficult 
issue.  Even though, as mentioned earlier, the 1996 IR scheme was designed to encourage ‘extra 
loading’, it remains possible that between 1991 and 1996 employee effort rose a lot, independently 
of the motivational factors in our model.  It is possible that employees erroneously attributed their 
increased effort and decreased cooperation to management’s use of PRP, and the pay scheme 
behaved more like a ‘lightning conductor’ for discontent over increased work loads.  Any other pay 
system might have attracted the same unpopularity.  It is hard to test the presence of such effects on 
the civil service departments because everyone was subject to the same incentive system and there 
is no obvious control group.  However, our two NHS trust hospitals had significant numbers of staff 
who were not covered by the PRP arrangements, and yet workloads also were judged to have 
increased there (see Table 5 above).  Thus, they offer a partial control group to test some of the 
PRP effects. 
In the two hospitals, management had used the introduction of performance pay and local 
pay determination as an opportunity to rationalise pay structures and to eliminate a large number of 
anomalous bonuses and other premium payments.  These had accumulated over the years, and now 
left the hospitals open to the risk of equal value cases.  To buy out all of these premia so that no one 
would be worse of financially under the new system would have been inordinately expensive.  So 
management made the transition voluntary for incumbent staff, the move to local trust contracts being 
compulsory only for new recruits and those promoted.  This means that our ‘control group’ involves 
an element of self-selection, but not for reasons directly related to the incentive aspects of PRP.  The 
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managers who introduced the change took the view that the most common reason for remaining on 
the older nationally determined ‘Whitley’ scales was that the individuals concerned would be worse 
off financially.  Notably, they would lose extra pay for weekend working.  This was borne out by the 
‘written-in’ replies on our questionnaires, a large number of which stressed financial reasons rather 
than hostility to the principle of PRP. 
For each of the outcome variables, positive incentive and negative de-motivation, we cross-
tabulated the means by type of contract, and in one of the hospitals we were able also to cross them 
with whether or not individual staff had received a performance appraisal.  In each hospital, those 
covered by PRP on trust contracts responded more favourably, being both more responsive to the 
incentive element, and less likely to express demotivation.  The results are shown in Appendix Table 
2 together with the standard errors which show the means are significantly different.  We observed 
too a similar albeit weaker effect from having had an appraisal.  In fact, most staff who had not been 
appraised at the time of our survey wished to have one, a clear indication that there was no hostility 
to the process itself. 
Although there is almost certainly an element of self-selection as some of those who chose to 
remain on Whitley scales objected in principle to PRP, the majority chose to remain on them for 
reasons unconnected with the incentive and goal-setting elements of PRP.  Thus, the stronger 
positive judgements and milder negative judgements of PRP revealed in the two hospitals among 
those covered, as compared with those on Whitley contracts, reinforce the view that PRP has been 
instrumental in increasing work levels and has not been a mere ‘lightning conductor’ for discontent. 
 
 
7.  Performance Outcomes, Measurement and Commitment 
 
The overall effects of performance pay in the public services as published in our earlier report 
showed that on balance PRP had not motivated staff, and it had led to widespread feelings of 
divisiveness and demotivation, especially in the two civil service departments (Marsden and French, 
1998).  Nevertheless, despite these observations, it was not evident that productivity had suffered.  
Indeed, there was a distinct possibility that PRP had helped to raise it, although there was also a 
serious question as to whether this effect could be sustained over the longer run given the effects on 
employee motivation. 
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In this paper, we have tried to probe deeper and measure the positive and negative effects 
of PRP both on employee motivation and on aspects of workplace-level organisational 
performance.  Our study confirms that PRP in the British public services has had a positive incentive 
effect for significant numbers of employees, but that this depends on getting above average 
additional financial reward, and even more importantly, on the quality of the goal-setting and 
appraisal process.  Our analysis confirms the corrosive effect on employee motivation of appraisals 
that employees feel are not a fair reflection of their performance.  Although discussions of PRP for 
top executives, sales and sports personnel have tended to focus on the incentive effect of additional 
rewards, the experience of ordinary public employees in our study strongly suggests that the strength 
of marginal financial incentives is weak compared with that of goal-setting and appraisal.  Likewise, 
the damage done by poorly conducted appraisals outweighs the benefits of additional financial 
incentives. 
By looking at line-manager judgements of employee effort and cooperation across 
workplaces, we have been able to establish a link between employee motivation and organisational 
performance.  These confirm that the motivational outcomes matter for the organisation.  Where 
PRP motivated employees positively, there workplace performance, as judged by line-managers, 
was better.  Where it demotivated employees, line-manager judgements of workplace performance 
were less favourable. 
Why should PRP apparently perform less well for ‘ordinary’ employees than for those who 
have been extensively studied so far? One answer may lie in the difficulty of grading performance in 
a way that staff find acceptable.  One of the chief lessons from our study has been that the way 
appraisal and goal-setting divide employees between different performance grades is critical to the 
success of PRP.  Wherever the line is drawn, it is likely to be controversial, especially when, as 
shown by our study, employees are suspicious of both management’s intentions and its competence 
to appraise fairly.  If one assumes that performance follows a roughly normal distribution, as in 
Figure 2, then separating off the extreme good (A) and bad (D) performers may achieve the desired 
incentive effects with relatively small divisiveness effects.  At the two ends of the distribution, the 
number of individuals is fairly small so those in the immediate proximity of the dividing lines are 
relatively few.  In contrast to these ‘thinly populated’ sections of the distribution, the area close to 
the dividing line that separates the top 30% from the rest is much more densely populated, and many 
more employees feel the injustice of being just on the wrong side of the divide.  ‘Why does my 
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performance, which has been very similar to that of my colleague, warrant only a C when my 
colleague is awarded an B?’  Such questions are very hard for individual line managers to answer 
convincingly.  Thus, Prendergast’s observation that there is a dearth of studies on ordinary 
employees is a very serious one because when we grade performance of ordinary employees we 
have to distinguish the Bs from the Cs far more often than the Ds and the As.  Many more 
employees risk being adversely affected by poorly conducted appraisals at the boundary between C 
and B than between B and A.  It may therefore be much easier to run performance pay schemes for 
employees at either extreme, than for the mass of ordinary employees in the middle. 
 
 
Figure 2.  The Problems of Distinguishing Among Middle-Range Performers  
 
N u m  bers
Performance
level
Grade C and Grade B performersUnder-performers Top performers
D C B A
 
 
Finally, our study also suggests that commitment, in its affective form to one’s office 
colleagues and workplace, and in its goal-centred form to an idea of public service, plays an 
important role.  In particular, it seemed to help offset the potential negative effects of badly 
conducted appraisals, and to boost confidence in incentives.  In this respect, it emerges as an 
important factor for the principal-agent analysis.  The pure self-interest version of the theory is 
extremely vulnerable to break-down if employees lose confidence in management’s good faith and in 
its competence to measure performance.  If you don’t think you’ll get the reward even if you 
perform well, there is no incentive in this model to do anything other than supply the low level of 
effort.  Commitment to one’s workplace and to public service appear then as important stabilisers, 
allowing management to get away with poorly conducted appraisals for a time at least.  The 
employees may feel fed-up with management and distrust them, but at the end of the day, they see 
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themselves as serving the community to which they belong.  Of course, they expect to be paid 
appropriately for this, but they will tolerate a certain amount of perceived unfairness without it 
affecting performance.  A separate analysis that we have undertaken of the Inland Revenue between 
1991 and 1996 suggests that commitment can decline over time, as can the belief that one’s work 
contributes to an important public service if pressure rather than persuasion is used to increase work 
loads (Marsden and French, 2001). 
20 
Table 1.  Summary of Main Variables Analysed 
 
Dependent variables 
 
Control variables Independent variables 
I.  Directly attributed outcomes a) Structural a) Incentive effect 
a) Effects on individual motivation Employment Service (cf IR) Gets above average PRP 
Rewards good work Hospitals  My work always better than 
others 
Work beyond job requirements  Schools   
Good principle Professional (cf Mgrs) b) Goal-setting 
Show more initiative in my work Technical Mgrs set targets more clearly 
 Clerical  
b) Impact on work relations Service c) Quality of appraisal 
Causes jealousies among the staff Craft My last appraisal was fair 
Undermines team working  Mgrs know enough to appraise 
me 
Reduced my wish to cooperate with 
mgt. 
b) Biodata  
Management operate a quota Length of service d) Measurability of 
performance 
Doubt I’ll get a good appraisal even if 
I perform well 
Male  Performance hard to measure 
  There is a standard for the job 
c) Communicating objectives   
Raised my awareness of org’s 
objectives 
 e) Intrinsic/extrinsic motivation 
  Intrinsically motivated Factor 1 
  Extrinsically motivated Factor 2 
   
  f) Commitment 
  Affective commitment Factor 1 
  Goal commitment Factor 2 
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Table 2.  General Results:  Overall Probabilities of Believing Particular Effects of PRP 
 
Mean values of the dependent variables used % agree Disagree/ no view 
PRP is a good principle 51.5 48.5 
PRP means good work is recognised and rewarded 33.3 66.7 
PRP has given me an incentive to work beyond my job requirements 16.6 83.4 
PRP given me an incentive to show more initiative 17.9 82.1 
PRP has made me more aware of the org’s objectives 36.3 63.7 
PRP causes jealousies among staff 66.8 33.2 
PRP is bad for team working 46.5 53.5 
Management operate a quota 61.3 38.7 
PRP has made me less willing to cooperate with mgt. 17.3 82.7 
 
Note:  in the original questionnaires these questions offered a 5-point scale from disagree strongly to agree 
strongly. 
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Table 3.  Summary of the Logit Results 
 
 B SE B SE 
 Positive incentive 
effects 
 Negative 
demotivating 
effects 
 
Employment service .3013 .1757 -.6513** .1856 
NHS hospitals  -.1824 .1993 -1.9627** .2013 
Schools  -1.5893** .2233 -.6528** .2133 
Professionals  .1281 .1475 -.0754 .1261 
Technical .5801** .1975 .3966 .2028 
Clerical .5804** .1708 .3277 .1681 
Service .3923 .2908 .5867* .2885 
Craft .5450 .8919 .9617 .8453 
Length of service -.0173** .0069 .0035 .0068 
Male  -.0064 .1021 .0246 .0966 
My work better than others .2453** .0540 .0911 .0530 
Gets above average PRP .5546** .1104 -.3100** .1073 
Mgrs set targets more clearly .5560** .0471 -.2071** .0439 
My last appraisal was fair .1151** .0453 -.2962** .0438 
Mgrs know enough to appraise me -.0502 .0388 -.1245** .0372 
Performance hard to measure -.3403** .0464 .6899** .0484 
There is a standard for the job -.4802** .0496 -.0147 .0474 
Intrinsic motivation  .0593 .0543 .0126 .0540 
Extrinsic motivation -.0207 .0461 -.0543 .0451 
Affective commitment Factor 1 .3066** .0619 -.2112** .0591 
Goal commitment Factor 2 .1846** .0593 -.1463** .0566 
 .0433 .4595 -.1267 .4498 
N 2990  2990  
% correct  76.81%  73.30%  
Ch2 848.636  911.207  
Sig **  **  
R2 (Cox & Snell) .246  .261  
R2 (Nagelkerke) .340  .349  
 
Detailed logit coefficients are shown in Appendix Table 1.  Dependent variables ‘Positive incentive effects’ and 
‘Negative demotivating effects’.  The latter exclude the question about a ‘quota’ on good appraisals because this 
was not asked in the hospital with a trust-wide bonus where it would have made no sense to respondents.  ** 
significant at the 2% level, and * significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 4.  Alternative Measures of the Relative Strength of the Financial Incentive 
 
a) Probability of Positive Incentive Effects 
 
Variable Logit 
coefficient 
(B) 
Exp(B) Elasticity Logit coefficient for binary 
variables 
(B & SE) 
Gets above average PRP 0.55 1.74 0.32 0.54   (0.108) 
Mgrs set targets more clearly 0.56 1.74 4.82 1.21   (0.093) 
Doubt I'll get a good appraisal  0.12 1.12 1.09 0.33   (0.099) 
Performance hard to measure -0.34 0.71 -3.95 -0.62   (0.101) 
Affective commitment Factor 1 0.31 1.36 na 0.47   (0.104) 
Goal commitment Factor 2 0.18 1.20 na 0.41   (0.111) 
 
 
b) Probability of Negative Demotivating Effects 
 
Variable Logit 
coefficient 
(B) 
Exp(B) Elasticity Logit coefficient for binary 
variables 
(B & SE) 
Gets above average PRP -0.31 0.73 -0.11 -0.37   (0.106) 
Mgrs set targets more clearly -0.21 0.81 -1.13 -0.52   (0.090) 
My last appraisal was fair -0.30 0.74 -1.76 -0.62   (0.100) 
Managers know enough to appraise -0.12 0.88 -0.66 -0.29   (0.089) 
Performance hard to measure 0.69 1.99 5.03 1.33   (0.106) 
Affective commitment Factor 1 -0.21 0.81 na -0.23   (0.101) 
Goal commitment Factor 2 -0.15 0.86 na -0.30   (0.101) 
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Table 5.  Line Manager and Staff Views on Increased Effort and Cooperation with 
Management 
 
Question:  % replying ‘agree’ IR-91 IR-96 ES Individual PRP 
trust 
Group PRP trust 
Line manager views       
· PP has increased quantity of 
work done 
22 42 28 52 34 
· PP has reduced staff willingness 
to cooperate with management 
20 45 39 30 27 
Staff views       
· PP has increased quantity of 
work I do 
14 25 19 na na 
· PP has made me less willing to 
cooperate with management* 
10 30 26 19 14 
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Table 6.  The Effects of PRP on Work Effort and Cooperation by Workplace. 
Comparison of Line-Manager Judgements About Staff Performance with Staff Judgements 
about their Own Behaviour (Pearson Correlations) 
 
Line manager views:   Ordinary staff views  
PRP has:  PRP has: 
a) caused many staff to work harder  a) caused me to work harder 
1996 IR & ES-97 Pearson Correlation .609* 
(.027) 
  N 13 
1991 & 1996 IR & ES 97 Pearson Correlation .556** 
(.003) 
  N 26 
b) reduced staff willingness to 
cooperate with mgt. 
 b) reduced my willingness to 
cooperate with mgt. 
IR 96 & ES 97 Pearson Correlation .223 
(.486) 
 N 12 
IR 91 & 96 & ES 97 Pearson Correlation 0.835** 
(0.000) 
 N 25 
 
*  and **:  Correlation is significant respectively at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) and the 0.02 level (2-tailed).  
Significance levels in parentheses.  Executive offices with less than ten observations excluded because of 
statistical unreliability, and EO #32 (North West).  NHS excluded because question was not asked. 
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Table 7.  Regressions of Workplace Performance Scores on Individual Employee 
Motivation Data 
 
 
Dependent vble: 
Line manager views 
Positive 
incentive 
factors (B) a) 
Year 
dummies 
R2 Negative de-
motivating 
factors (B) a) 
Year 
dummies 
R2 
· PRP has caused 
many staff to 
work harder 
.01725** 
(.007) 
.468** .486 -.025** 
(.007) 
.471** .487 
· PRP has reduced 
staff willingness 
to cooperate with 
mgt. 
-.0165** 
(.006) 
.491** .569 .0886** 
(.006) 
.479** .587 
 
Simple OLS regressions.  N = 4594 analysis includes all offices.  Standard errors on B coefficients in parentheses.  
* Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level.  ** Coefficeint is significant at the 0.02 level. 
a) Excluding line managers.  Organisations:  Inland Revenue 1991 and 1996, Employment Service and NHS trust 
hospitals. 
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Table 8.  Determinants of Workplace Performance 1996-97 
 
 PRP has raised productivity PRP has reduced cooperation 
 B Std.  Error Elasticity 
* 10 
Sig B Std.  Error Elasticity 
* 10 
Sig 
(Constant) 2.909 0.066  ** 3.132 0.037  ** 
Employment Service dummy -0.173 0.022 -0.056 **  -0.146 0.012 -0.046 ** 
NHS trust hospitals dummy 0.143 0.028 0.254 ** -0.295 0.015 -0.520 ** 
Professional -0.010 0.033 -0.012  -0.009 0.018 -0.010  
Technician dummy  -0.024 0.025 -0.012  -0.010 0.014 -0.005  
Clerical dummy -0.001 0.024 -0.002  -0.007 0.014 -0.009  
Service isco dummy  -0.097 0.041 -0.023 ** 0.001 0.023 0.000  
Craft dummy  0.070 0.107 0.002  0.001 0.060 0.000  
Length of Service in Org -0.001 0.001 -0.030  0.000 0.001 0.002  
Male dummy  0.010 0.015 0.009  -0.005 0.008 -0.005  
My work better than others -0.008 0.007 -0.087  -0.002 0.004 -0.023  
Gets above average PRP 0.043 0.017 0.026 ** 0.009 0.009 0.005  
Mgrs set targets more 
clearly 
0.022 0.007 0.218 ** 0.011 0.004 0.108 ** 
My last appraisal was fair -0.016 0.006 -0.176 ** -0.003 0.004 -0.030  
Mgrs know enough to 
appraise me 
-0.000 0.005 -0.004  0.003 0.003 0.028  
Performance hard to measure 0.002 0.007 0.024  0.002 0.004 0.030  
There is a standard for the 
job 
-0.001 0.007 -0.012  -0.011 0.004 -0.142 ** 
Intrinsic motivation  0.015 0.007 -0.016 * 0.000 0.004 0.000  
Extrinsic motivation -0.012 0.006 0.001 + -0.002 0.003 0.000  
Affective commitment 
Factor 1 
-0.006 0.008 0.009  -0.014 0.005 0.021 ** 
Goal commitment Factor 2 0.021 0.008 -0.015 ** -0.004 0.005 0.003  
Adj r2  0.169    0.415    
F 20.774    69.889    
Sig **    **    
No of individuals  1946    1946    
No of workplaces 25    25    
 
Note:  OLS regression based on line-manager judgements of all workplaces, but excluding schools. 
Significance:  ** 2%; * 5%, + 10%. 
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8.  Appendix:  Survey Methods 
 
The research was based on questionnaire surveys to employees in the Inland Revenue, the 
Employment Service, two NHS trust hospitals operating PRP, and primary and secondary school 
head teachers between August 1996 and March 1997.  Where possible we sought the support of 
both management and unions.  In the hospitals, management distributed the questionnaires to all staff 
except doctors, who were outside the PRP scheme.  For the civil service and head teachers, the 
unions drew random samples of their members.  The response rate varied between a low of 20% in 
one of the hospitals and about 40% for head teachers, giving us a total sample of about 5,000.  Full 
details, together with checks for possible response bias, can be found in Marsden and French 
(1998).  We discussed our cross-section results in a series of feed-back seminars with management, 
unions, and other staff. 
Most of the attitudinal questions were measured as responses to five-point Likert scales 
running from ‘disagree strongly’, through ‘no view’ to ‘agree strongly’.  The dependent variables, 
were re-coded into binary variables for the logit analysis. 
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Appendix Table 1.  Logit Regression Results 
 Variable B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE 
  Rewards good 
work 
 Good principle  Work beyond 
job 
requirements 
 Show more 
initiative in 
my work 
 Raised my 
awareness of 
org’s 
objectives 
 
  gdwork_d  Ppgood_d  Mejob_d  Meinit_d  Aware_d  
Employment Service ORG_ES        .3000     .2088    .5393** .1752 -.7055** .2508 .0688 .2133 .4105** .1656 
Hospitals ORG_NHS      1.4336**    .2075  .3623 .1946 -.3064 .2318 -.6911** .2246 -.0417 .1863 
Schools ORG_SCHL     1.0977**    .2272  -1.4835** .2064 -1.3801** .2722 -1.6603** .2642 -1.0873** .2032 
Professional ISCO_PRF      -.0355     .1320    -.6310** .1289 .1578 .1896 -.0065 .1836 .0184 .1321 
Technical ISCO_TEC      .2131     .2275    .2587 .1873 .9453** .2560 .6625** .2474 .2614 .1843 
Clerical ISCO_CLE      .2743     .1823    -.2271 .1610 .6442** .2173 .5945** .2100 .4804** .1577 
Service ISCO_SER      .4095     .2916    -.5447 .2836 .3741 .3193 .4823 .3110 .7397** .2744 
Craft  ISCO_CRF      .7789     .8622    -.3494 .8810 -.7231 1.1536 .2780 .9335 -.5532 .8765 
Length of service LOSORG        .0043     .0073    -.0127* .0064 -.0214** .0087 -.0416** .0086 .0022 .0064 
Male  MALE_DUM      -.0556     .1046    .0229 .0935 .0678 .1289 -.0076 .1232 -.1057 .0942 
My work always better 
than others 
BETTERWK      .1960**    .0567  .2445** .0497 .3014** .0669 .2576** .0640 .0165 .0496 
Gets above average 
PRP 
GETPRP_D      .6164**    .1102  .4463** .1037 .6744** .1302 .4768** .1281 .0064 .1034 
Mgrs set targets more 
clearly 
PPTARGET      .5805**    .0484  .2633** .0424 .3937** .0601 .4791** .0577 .5250** .0433 
My last appraisal was 
fair 
EXPFAIR       .3060**    .0479  .0787 .0406 .1468** .0593 .1160* .0559 .0237 .0416 
Mgrs know enough to 
appraise me 
MGR_KNO       .0723     .0399    -.0702* .0351 .0842 .0490 -.0628 .0469 .0564 .0354 
Performance hard to 
measure 
PPMEASUR      -.5466**    .0480  -.6178** .0480 -.3340** .0548 -.2544** .0533 -.2240** .0431 
There is a standard for 
the job 
JOB_STD       -.2732**    .0491  -.1697** .0461 -.6624** .0588 -.6390** .0564 -.2259** .0451 
Intrinsic motivation 
(F1) 
INTRI_F1      .1256*     .0597   .0125 .0490 .0020 .0698 .1173 .0668 .1200** .0511 
Extrinsic motivation 
(F2) 
INTRI_F2      .1187**    .0495  .0008 .0422 -.0044 .0581 -.0722 .0547 .0044 .0429 
Affective commitment 
Factor 1 
COM_FAC1      .1642**    .0634  .1939** .0562 .2935** .0779 .2738** .0741 .2926** .0571 
Goal commitment 
Factor 2 
COM_FAC2      .1411**    .0605  .0836 .0538 .2728** .0746 .2339** .0715 .0622 .0546 
Constant       -2.3520**    .4735  2.2422** .4362 -.8048 .5622 -.0961 .5402 -.5657 .4241 
N  3058  3053  3062  3062  3059  
% pre-dicted  77.54%  71.48%  86.04%  84.85%  72.11%  
Chi2  988.061  821.336  643.775  630.796  593.056  
Sig  **  **  **  **  **  
R2 C&S  .274  .234  .188  .185  .175  
R2 Nk  .381  .312  .318  .303  .239  
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Appendix Table 1 continued 
 Variable B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE 
  Causes 
jealousies 
among the 
staff 
 Undermines 
team working 
 Management 
operate a 
quota 
 Reduced my 
wish to 
cooperate with 
mgt. 
 Even if I 
perform well 
doubt I’ll get a 
good appraisal 
 
  Jelus_d  Teambd_d  Quota_d  Mecoop_d  Expdbt_d  
Employment Service ORG_ES -.5658** .2122 -.4709** .1675 -.2320 .1877 -.2404 .1912 -.5614** .1701 
Hospitals ORG_NHS -1.6145** .2024 -2.0734** .2076 -.6346** .2194 -1.0345** .2696 -1.7945** .1967 
Schools ORG_SCHL -1.5630** .2234 -.2100 .2089 -.8499** .2194 -1.2773** .2773 .9687** .2074 
Professional ISCO_PRF -.2924** .1225 -.1234 .1227 .3836** .1244 .2176 .2140 .7170** .1376 
Technical ISCO_TEC -.0371 .2365 .2576 .1885 .4931** .1995 -.0362 .2167 .2271 .1858 
Clerical ISCO_CLE -.3629* .1773 .1725 .1656 .8096** .1752 .3378 .1989 .6519** .1623 
Service ISCO_SER -.3970 .2645 .5390 .3192 .9197 .4769 .7363 .3888 .7556** .2728 
Craft  ISCO_CRF 2.2069 1.4743 1.7145* .7984 1.1147 1.0147 .7737 1.0200 .5647 .8348 
Length of service LOSORG 6.81E-05 .0071 -.0005 .0065 .0086 .0071 .0232** .0080 .0131* .0066 
Male  MALE_DUM .1087 .0995 .1208 .0910 -.0923 .0974 .3852** .1187 -.3301** .0979 
My work always better 
than others 
BETTERWK .1040 .0535 .0595 .0504 .1171* .0551 -.0970 .0626 .0784 .0510 
Gets above average PRP GETPRP_D .0757 .1091 -.1770 .1025 -.5416** .1043 -.1645 .1470 -1.0071** .1048 
Mgrs set targets more 
clearly 
PPTARGET -.1214** .0451 -.0879* .0418 -.2707** .0451 -.2733** .0551 -.0815 .0438 
My last appraisal was fair EXPFAIR -.0503 .0439 -.1075** .0407 -.3447** .0453 -.4052** .0506 -.4771** .0445 
Mgrs know enough to 
appraise me 
MGR_KNO -.1034** .0383 -.1460** .0350 -.0265 .0384 -.1189** .0442 .0086 .0365 
Performance hard to 
measure 
PPMEASUR .7276** .0478 .6734** .0479 .3105** .0467 .3068** .0638 .3028** .0448 
There is a standard for 
the job 
JOB_STD -.0355 .0471 .0342 .0458 .0830 .0480 .0791 .0623 -.0186 .0472 
Intrinsic motivation (F1) INTRI_F1 -.0156 .0568 .0729 .0505 .0644 .0554 .0589 .0583 .0327 .0518 
Extrinsic motivation 
(F2) 
INTRI_F2 .0014 .0451 -.0469 .0431 .0635 .0468 .0243 .0511 .0920* .0439 
Affective commitment 
Factor 1 
COM_FAC1 -.1502** .0600 -.1806** .0570 -.2149** .0618 -.6198** .0708 -.2133** .0581 
Goal commitment Factor 
2 
COM_FAC2 -.1392** .0569 -.1902** .0543 -.1490** .0587 -.0578 .0691 -.0283 .0560 
Constant       -.1709 .4512 -1.6415** .4340 .7644 .4543 -.6780 .5669 .8292 .4404 
N  3058  3059  2723  3056  3062  
% pre-dicted  73.43%  70.44%  71.04%  84.55%  75.03%  
Chi2  714.400  809.362  624.015  631.200  870.308  
Sig  **  **  **  **  **  
R2 C&S  .207  .231  .204  .185  .246  
R2 Nk  .287  .308  .276  .308  .332  
 
Note:  The organisation and occupation dummies respectively take the Inland Revenue, and management as their benchmark.  The coefficients show how much working in a 
particular organisation or occupation increases (if positive) or decreases (if negative) the probability of agreeing with one of the dependent variable questions.  All 
independent variables were run for each dependent variable, but we report only coefficients significant at the 5% level or less. 
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Appendix Table 2.  Control Group Analysis of PRP Effects 
Comparing those covered by PRP (trust contracts) and those not (Whitley contracts) and whether or not a performance appraisal had been 
held. 
 
NHS contract type  Rewards good 
work 
Good 
principle 
Work beyond 
job 
requirements 
Show more 
initiative in 
my work 
Raised my 
awareness of 
org’s 
objectives 
Causes 
jealousies 
among the 
staff 
Undermines 
team working 
Reduced my 
wish to 
cooperate 
with mgt. 
Even if I 
perform well 
doubt I’ll get 
a good 
appraisal 
Appraisal held            
Trust contract Mean 3.56 3.22 2.67 2.65 2.94 3.39 2.52 2.41 3.02 
 Std.  Error  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 
 N 533 529 526 525 523 534 532 534 536 
Whitley contract Mean 2.96 2.47 2.16 2.08 2.55 3.59 2.78 2.78 3.43 
 Std.  Error  0.08 0.07 0.22 0.20 0.25 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 
 N 261 261 22 23 22 262 259 263 258 
Appraisal not held           
Trust contract Mean 3.44 3.10 2.58 2.49 2.89 3.09 2.42 2.43 2.91 
 Std.  Error  0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.07 
 N 267 266 258 254 259 265 266 267 234 
Whitley contract Mean 2.80 2.26 2.09 1.94 1.97 3.61 2.86 2.96 3.75 
 Std.  Error  0.08 0.07 0.19 0.13 0.18 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 
 N 226 227 17 20 17 228 228 227 215 
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9.  Methodological Tables.  Factor Analysis for Key Dimensions Variables 
 
 
9.1  Simplifiying outcome variables 
 
Table A.  Deriving the two summary outcome variables of PRP 
 
  Component   
  Positive incentive 
effects 
Demotivation & 
divisiveness effects 
Rewards good work .540 -.428 
Good principle .544 -.298 
Work beyond job requirements .791 -4.604E-02 
Show more initiative in my work .802 -4.478E-02 
Raised my awareness of org’s objectives .595 -2.959E-02 
Causes jealousies among the staff 5.631E-02 .720 
Undermines team working -.128 .745 
Reduced my wish to cooperate with mgt. -7.992E-02 .574 
Even if I perform well doubt I’ll get a good appraisal -.249 .465 
Extraction Method:  Principal Component Analysis.    Rotation Method:  Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a  Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
 
 
9.2  Derivation of the commitment variable 
 
Table B.  Factor analysis of commitment variables 
 
 Affective 
commitment 
Goal 
commitment 
  1 2 
Working in the Org.   means a great 
deal to me 
.805 .263 
I feel "part of the family" in my 
present office/hospital/school 
.750 -1.374E-02 
I would be very happy to spend the 
rest of my career with the org. 
.731 8.319E-02 
I do not feel ‘emotionally attached’ to 
the Inland Revenue 
.714 .189 
Whenever changes made in this org 
employees usually lose out in the end 
-.387 -.103 
I think that I could easily become as 
attached to another organisation as I 
am to the Inland Revenue 
-.506 -2.050E-02 
By working in the Organisation, I feel 
that I am contributing to an important 
public service 
.313 .634 
Don't award PRP to retain staff 5.185E-02 -.869 
33  
9.3  Derivation of measures of the quality of appraisal 
 
Table C:  Factor analysis of appraisal quality.  (trust-wide bonus hospital) 
 
 1 Consultation 2 Supportive 3 Clarity 
Throughout the last year, I had sufficient opportunity  
to discuss my performance with my line manager 
.895 -.193 .214 
In the last year, I have had sufficient opportunity to 
discuss and clarify my role with my line manager 
.870 -.241 .215 
In the last year, I have had sufficient opportunity to 
identify objectives and targets with my line manager 
.855 -.223 .248 
In the last year, I have had sufficient opportunity to 
discuss my personal development needs with my line 
manager 
.843 -.258 .264 
I found the discussion irrelevant -.219 .835 -.151 
I found the discussion superficial -.218 .808 -.212 
I found the discussion threatening -.120 .757 -.104 
I found the discussion useful .318 -.679 .297 
I am clear about my current objectives and targets .227 -.142 .870 
I am clear about my current job role .151 -.145 .849 
I am clear about my personal development needs .209 -.237 .637 
I understand my manager's rating of my performance .425 -.222 .577 
Extraction Method:  Principal Component Analysis.    
Rotation Method:  Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
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Table D.  Regressing the general questions on appraisals and PRP on three factors of 
appraisal quality (group bonus hospital) 
 
 Expdbt_d Expfr_d Target_d Mgrkno_d Measur_d Bettrwk_d 
NHS contract type 1.6977** 
(.2971) 
.0791 
(.3388) 
-.3532 
(.2825) 
-7.3189 
(19.4202) 
.3695 
(.3695) 
.0183 
(.2714) 
Professional .9077 
(.8037) 
-.2824 
(.8459) 
-1.6467** 
(.6927) 
-2.0758 
(1.1566) 
1.4599* 
(.6495) 
.1337 
(.6602) 
Clerical dummy .1842 
(.8580) 
-.9876 
(.8852) 
-.9954 
(.7231) 
-1.2138 
(1.1618) 
.3279 
(.6763) 
.7772 
(.6942) 
Service isco dummy  1.8671* 
(.8815) 
-.6491 
(.9524) 
.1187 
(.7707) 
-.8329 
(1.1979) 
-.0672 
(.7216) 
1.1588 
(.7361) 
Craft dummy  1.0384 
(1.7075) 
-5.2542 
(13.6594) 
-.8291 
(1.7162) 
-7.5397 
(55.2887) 
5.4767 
(14.2285) 
.9405 
(1.4810) 
Length of Service in 
Org 
-.0032 
(.0212) 
.0065 
(.0248) 
.0189 
(.0205) 
.0027 
(.0286) 
.0081 
(.0217) 
.0370 
(.0197) 
Male dummy  -.2942 
(.4142) 
-1.2996* 
(.4362) 
-.7812 
(.4034) 
-1.1434* 
(.5806) 
.5767 
(.4038) 
.4871 
(.3574) 
Consultation (wtd) .0033 
(.1317) 
.8239** 
(.1532) 
.3517** 
(.1401) 
.6679** 
(.2355) 
.0110 
(0.1335) 
-.2530* 
(.1236) 
Supportive (wtd) .0165 
(.1313) 
-.9009** 
(.1653) 
-.4588** 
(.1363) 
-.6023** 
(.1896) 
.1152 
(.1328) 
-.1374 
(.1221) 
Clarity (wtd) -.3111** 
(.1333) 
.8298** 
(.1567) 
.2782* 
(.1356) 
.7481** 
(.2119) 
-.3466** 
(.1381) 
.1239 
(.1221) 
Constant -3.9172 1.2587 1.0799 8.5656 -.8155 -1.3842 
N 345 344 348 207 347 348 
% correct 72.69% 78.65% 71.11% 72.49% 71.20% 65.71% 
Chi2 57.663 124.114 46.65 60.057 36.895 19.435 
Sig ** ** ** ** ** * 
R2 (Cox & Snell) .163 .319 .133 .258 .107 .058 
R2 (Nagelkerke) .225 .437 .181 .349 .150 .079 
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